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Introduction
Clark and Konrad (2007) and Hausken (2008a) formulate models of the attack and defense of a network of targets in which the outcome of the conflict at each target is determined by a contest success function that maps the players' resource allocations into their probabilities of success.
1 If the defender (attacker) allocates a force of d i ≥ 0 (a i ≥ 0) to target, or component, i, then the probability that target i is successfully defended is given by the contest success function p D,i (d i , a i ), which may take one of several forms including, but not limited to, the general ratio-form specification of the contest success function given by
where m i ≥ 0 is an exogenous parameter that specifies the level of noise in contest i. In the trivial case where m i = 0, each player wins contest i with probability (1/2) regardless of the players' force allocations. The interpretation of a strictly positive but low value for m i is that contest i involves a substantial amount of noise conditional on the profile of allocations (see Konrad and Kovenock 2009 for a discussion of how much noise is implied). When m i is high, with m i = ∞ the limiting case, each contest has a low amount of, or no, noise.
The outcome of the overall conflict is determined by the outcomes at the individual targets. For example in infrastructure networks there often exist particular targets or combinations of targets which if destroyed would be sufficient to either disable or disrupt the entire network. In the context of an arbitrarily complex network of targets, Hausken (2008a) uses the players' sets of first-order conditions to identify a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and then examines properties arising in that solution. In this comment we provide necessary conditions for the solution in Hausken (2008a) to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point and show that these conditions are quite restrictive.
Section 2 reviews the characterization of equilibrium given by Hausken (2008a) and provides necessary conditions for the solution in Hausken (2008a) to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point. For the portion of the parameter space in which the solution given in Hausken (2008a) does not form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point, there exist mixedstrategy Nash equilibria.
2 Section 3 summarizes the existing results on mixed-strategy equilibria. Many of the existing results in the contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense 1 The contest success function may be interpreted as the specifying the probability that component i is completely destroyed or alternatively the degree to which it is damaged.
2 For general Nash equilibrium existence proofs covering this special case see Montiero and Page (2007) and Tian (2009 of networks of targets build upon the characterization in Hausken (2008a) . Section 2 briefly discusses how the parameter restrictions on the first-order approach impact the related literature. Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) 3 demonstrate how to construct mixed-strategy equilibria for benchmark special cases in this class of games. These two articles provide a foundation for examining the parameter ranges of those models in the related literature which have no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We view the characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibria over these parameter ranges as an important area for future research.
Model and Main Result
The basic model of attack and defense of networks of targets is formally described as follows. Two players, an attacker, A, and a defender, D, simultaneously allocate their forces across a finite number, n ≥ 2, of targets indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The overall outcome of the conflict across the network of targets is determined by the outcomes at the individual targets. Beginning with the outcomes at the individual targets, let a i (d i ) denote the level of force allocated by the attacker (defender) to target i. The probability that target i is successfully defended is given by
The probability that target i is successfully attacked is given by
. . , p D,n ) denote the probability that the network of n targets is successfully defended. As in Hausken (2008a), we will focus on the simple series network, or what Clark and Konrad (2007) refer to as a weakest-link network. 4 The second simple type of network, referred to as a parallel network by Hausken (2008a) or a best-shot network by Clark and Konrad (2007) , is successfully defended if the defender successfully defends at least one target within the network. As noted by both Clark and Konrad (2007) and Hausken (2008a) , a best-shot network is the same as a weakest-link network with the labeling of the attacker and defender reversed.
A weakest-link (series) network is successfully defended if the defender wins all of the targets within the network. Conversely, an attack on a weakest-link network is successful if the attacker wins at least one target in the network. In this case,
Assume that players are risk neutral and have asymmetric objectives. The attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target, and the attacker's payoff for the successful attack of at least one target is v A > 0. Let a (d) denote the attacker's (defender's) n-tuple of force allocations. The attacker's expected payoff function is given by
where c A,i is the attacker's constant unit cost of force expenditure to target i. The defender's objective is to preserve the entire network, and the defender's payoff for successfully defending the network is v D > 0. The defender's expected payoff function is given by
where c D,i is the defenders constant unit cost of force expenditure to target i. The force allocated to each target must be nonnegative.
The set of first-order conditions of the players' optimization problems is given by equation (14) of Hausken (2008a) . In each contest i = 1, . . . , n,
and
Let a * and d * denote the solution to the first-order conditions, for the attacker and defender respectively, where as given by equation (15) of Hausken (2008a) ,
for each i = 1, . . . , n.
The players' expected payoffs from the pair of n-tuples (a * , d * ) are given by equation (17) of Hausken (2008a) ,
Because each player can ensure a payoff of 0 by doing nothing, in any equilibrium each player must have a nonnegative payoff. When the solution of the first-order conditions, the strategy profile (a * , d * ), results in negative expected payoffs for either or both players, the first-order conditions do not yield a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point. Furthermore, it is incorrect to assert, as does Hausken (2008a) , that if a player's expected payoff given in (9) or (10) is negative, then there exists an equilibrium in which that player allocates zero forces to each target (yielding a payoff of zero) and the other player earns arbitrarily close to his valuation for the system by allocating an arbitrarily small amount of force to one or more of the targets. 5 To see that such a pair of n-tuples does not form an equilibrium, assume that the defender allocates zero forces to each target and that the attacker allocates an arbitrarily small amount of force to one or more targets. In such a case, the defender's best response is to outbid the attacker, by an arbitrarily small amount, at each of the attacked targets. Such a strategy increases the defender's payoff from zero to arbitrarily close to his valuation for the entire system. A similar argument rules out the possibility that allocating zeros everywhere could be an equilibrium strategy for the attacker. Proposition 1 below provides necessary conditions for the strategy-profile (a * , d * ) to form a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point.
Proposition 1. Two necessary conditions for the strategy-profile (a * , d * ) to form a purestrategy Nash equilibrium in the model of attack and defense of networks of targets are,
First, observe that if either or both of the conditions in Proposition 1 fail to hold, then one or both of the players' expected payoffs, given in equations (9) and (10), are negative and the strategy profile (a * , d * ) is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Because the players'
objective functions fail to be quasi-concave with respect to the relevant choice variables (each player's n-tuple of force) for a large portion of the parameter space, standard arguments on the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium do not apply. Therefore solving the system of first-order conditions, as does Hausken (2008a), does not guarantee equilibrium.
Whether the conditions stated in equation (11) 6 Observe that these conditions can be written more succinctly as Although we do not know at this time whether these conditions are sufficient, as a general proposition the nature of equilibrium strategies is quite nuanced and varies over the parameter space, as we detail below in our discussion of mixed-strategy equilibria.
There are a number of articles that analyze variations of the Hausken (2008a) framework that are also erroneous without the imposition of more restrictive parameter assumptions. These variations fall into two groups. First, both Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010) contain closely related technical errors that invalidate those characterizations of Nash equilibrium for a substantial portion of the parameter space. In particular, in both of those games each of the players has a secure utility that can be assured regardless of the action of the other player. But in the solutions that are given Hausken (2008b) and Hausken (2010) there exist large portions of the parameter space in which one or both of the players obtain a level of utility that is below their secure utility level, and hence these solutions do not form pure-strategy equilibria.
There is also a growing literature that relies upon the equilibrium characterization in Hausken (2008a) It is beyond the scope of this comment to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium with an even allocation of forces that is assumed in all of these articles. However, it is straightforward to modify the necessary conditions given in Proposition 1 above for each of those particular models. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3 below, Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) demonstrate how to correctly construct the mixed-strategy equilibria for benchmark cases for which there exist no pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We conjecture that employing their methods, the set of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria can be derived for the relevant parameter ranges of those models. We view the completion of this equilibrium characterization as an important area for future research. 
Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
A mixed strategy, which we term a distribution of force, for player i is an n-variate distribution function
The n-tuple of player i's allocation of force across the n targets is a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate distribution function P i . It is beyond the scope of this comment to provide a complete characterization for this class of games. We will instead highlight the existing results on mixed strategy equilibria for this game (Clark and Konrad 2007 and Roberson 2010a ).
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In dealing with multivariate mixed strategies it is helpful to reduce the number of exogenous parameters in the model. Towards this end, assume that for each player the unit costs are symmetric across targets and players and are normalized to one (i.e., c A,i = c D,i = 1 for all i) and that the level of noise at each target is the same (i.e., m i = m for all i).
The case of m = 1 is analyzed by Clark and Konrad (2007) . If v D ≥ (n − 1)v A , then this game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that coincides with the characterization given above for a 
With the remaining probability player D chooses the n-tuple d = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
, and player D's expected payoff is 0.
The case of m = ∞ is analyzed by Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) . In this deterministic case we assume that in the event that the players allocate the same level of resources to a target, the defender wins the target. 10 There exist multiple mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in this case. Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) provide one equilibrium and characterize properties that hold in all equilibria. Proposition 3 provides one property that demonstrates how the nature of equilibrium drastically changes. In the case of m = ∞, equilibrium requires that the attacker (who may disable the network by winning any single target) randomly allocate his forces to at most one target, rather than to multiple targets. In fact, recent experimental work provides some support for this behavior. Kovenock, Roberson and Sheremeta (2010) find that in experiments undertaken with m = ∞ and n = 4, over 80% of attackers utilize a stochastic guerilla warfare strategy that entails launching an attack on only a single target. (Contrary to the equilibrium prediction, Kovenock et al. (2010) also find that with m = 1 attackers launch a single attack almost 45% of the time.)
The case of m = ∞ is an extreme benchmark case, playing a role for contests with sunk expenditures similar to classical Bertrand competition in price-setting games with perfect substitutes. However, there is good reason to believe that cases involving finite but high m are qualitatively closer to this benchmark than to the pure-strategy profiles examined in Hausken (2008a) . A complete treatment of simultaneous move games of attack and defense in which the conditions in equation (11) are violated is still an open question. However, we do know that for a single contest with linear costs, (the famous Tullock rent-seeking model), a pure-strategy equilibrium exists only for m less than or equal to 2. For m greater than 2, as in the m = ∞ case, no pure-strategy equilibria exist. Although there has not been a complete characterization of the equilibrium set for m > 2, except for Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996) characterization for m = ∞, we do know that when m > 2 there exist Nash equilibria that yield payoffs identical to the unique equilibrium payoffs when m = ∞ (Alcalde and Dahm 2010).
Unfortunately, the nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibrium and characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria has been almost entirely overlooked in the contest-theoretic literature on attack and defense of networks of targets. In fact, as shown in Proposition 1, the pure-strategy equilibria applied extensively in the literature exist only for a very restrictive set of parameters. Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010a) provide a foundation for constructing the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in the parameter ranges of those models for which no pure-strategy equilibria exist. This characterization remains an important area for future research.
